Readers of this blog are reminded that courts and tribunals in the Australian legal system do not exercise some broad power to investigate matters and do what they think is just or right. The court sits as a referee to adjudicate the issues that the parties bring before them, and only those issues.

This was an issue in Browne v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) [2026] QIRC 220.  Mr Browne is a paramedic employed by the Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS).  He was subject to disciplinary proceedings over his conduct in March and November 2022. In short it was alleged that on four occasions in March he failed to appropriately notify the coordination centre of his ‘unit status’ whilst on shift and that in November he failed to follow a lawful direction with respect to his conduct whilst on supervised practice.

Relevantly there were three steps in the process. The first was that, as a result of his conduct, he was placed on ‘supervised practice’ on 6 April 2022 pending the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings. He was invited to respond to the various allegations before the second step where the decision maker ‘found all five allegations substantiated on the balance of probabilities’ ([10]). Mr Browne was then invited to ‘show cause’ why certain disciplinary measures should not be imposed. He did respond before the third step which was the imposition of disciplinary penalties, in particular Mr Browne was denied two renumeration increments and lost his status as a senior paramedic ([9]). Mr Browne appealed to the Industrial Relations Commission.

Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon said (at [7]):

Having reviewed Officer Browne’s notice of appeal, I have identified the following grounds upon which Officer Browne says the decision was not fair and reasonable: the disciplinary action is disproportionate; Officer Brown was not afforded procedural fairness; prolonged supervised practice; the supervised practice arrangements are not reasonable; the disciplinary outcome is inconsistent with that imposed on an employee for similar conduct.

QAS argued that ‘… ‘the decision to place Officer Browne on supervised practice in April 2022 was a ‘separate decision of the QAS’. The Respondent says that supervised practice arrangements are an administrative decision put in place to ensure that QAS can appropriately manage operations where allegations of inappropriate conduct have arisen.’

The Tribunal found that ‘The decision to place Officer Browne on ‘supervised practice’ is a separate decision and is not a disciplinary action taken as a part of the decision under appeal’ ([74]). Further Mr Browne did not appeal the finding that the complaints had been established, even though ‘Officer Browne was informed of his entitlement to lodge an appeal against that decision but elected not to do so’ ([16]). Pidgeon IC said (at [18] emphasis added):

Officer Browne did not appeal the December 2025 disciplinary findings decision. The Appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against. On that basis, the matter for my consideration is whether, based on the substantiated allegations and associated disciplinary findings, the discipline action imposed on Officer Browne is fair and reasonable. The appeal was therefore limited to whether the penalties imposed were fair and reasonable. 

Because the finding that the complaints had been established was not under appeal, the Tribunal could not consider submissions that the conduct was not sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action ([24]), that his conduct did not depart from the expectations of the QAS ([27]) or that he had adequate explanation for his conduct including undiagnosed PTSD ([41]).

With respect to his PTSD that may have been relevant to the final outcome but he led no evidence to support the claim. Pidgeon IC said (at [31]):

There is no evidence before me regarding Officer Browne’s reported medical condition and what impact it may have had on the substantiated conduct. In circumstances where Officer Browne did not provide any medical evidence as a part of his show cause response addressing mitigation, I find it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to state that:

“Noting you have not provided any medical evidence to support the submission that you were suffering a diagnosed psychological injury at the time of the allegations (between 13 March 2022 and 5 November 2022), I do not consider your submissions in relation to this matter give rise to any relevant mitigating circumstance.” 

Finally, Mr Browne had a deep grievance with QAS. The Tribunal said (at [51]-[52]):

Officer Browne says that QAS ‘should consider its own institutional blind spot’ and that it is unwilling to accept that a supervisor may have acted unfairly or abused power. Officer Browne goes on to declare that ‘the lack of insight lies in QAS’s refusal to properly examine whether its own supervisory and disciplinary process was misused’.

Officer Browne’s submissions on this point demonstrate the depth of his grievance with the Respondent’s position. Given Officer Browne maintains that he has done nothing wrong, that his conduct was appropriate and that the fault lies with the Respondent, I find it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to ‘hold serious concerns’ that Officer Browne lacks the capacity to modify his behaviour.

Discussion

The proceedings are adversarial, that is the applicant brings their case, and the respondent replies to that case. The Tribunal decides issues of fact and law to determine whether, in this case the penalties imposed were ‘fair and reasonable’.

What we can see here is that the appeal was limited to the penalties only. Mr Browne did not lodge an appeal against the decision to put him on supervised practice (and it is not clear from the decision whether he could have appealed that decision) nor did he appeal the decision to find the allegations were proved (and he could have appealed that decision).  The Tribunal was therefore limited to only deciding whether the penalties were ‘fair and reasonable’ given that the conduct complained of had been established. 

Further the Tribunal was not there to investigate Mr Browne’s claims of PTSD or a QAS ‘institutional blind spot’.  As in any adversarial case, ‘he who asserts must prove’ so it was up to him to lead evidence to support any claim.  Certainly with respect to the PTSD, he failed to do so. 

This case was determined ‘on the papers’ (ie without oral argument in court) and it is not stated whether Mr Browne was or was not legally represented. There may have been sound legal and tactical reasons to appeal as he did, or it may have been a misunderstanding as to what was required; we don’t know. But Mr Browne is bound by the decisions made when filing the appeal and cannot raise matters in submissions that do not align with the grounds of appeal in the application.  So if you’re going to take a matter to court, it is worth considering the advice from The Cruel Sea – 

You better get a lawyer, son

You better get a real good one

This blog is a general discussion of legal principles only.  It is not legal advice. Do not rely on the information here to make decisions regarding your legal position or to make decisions that affect your legal rights or responsibilities. For advice on your particular circumstances always consult an admitted legal practitioner in your state or territory.