The heading, above, is my summary of the decision in Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom [2026] EWCA Civ 6.  This is an English case (EWCA stands for England and Wales Court of Appeal) but the reasoning may be of interest.

Mr Groom was a Coastguard Rescue Officer (CRO). His relationship with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (the MCA) was described in various documents as a ‘volunteer’.  As a volunteer he agreed to be bound by the Code of Conduct and to act in accordance with the terms of the Volunteer Handbook, both published by the MCA. These documents required a CRO to comply with the MCA’s instructions, policies and procedures and to maintain their competence by attending training and a reasonable number of call outs ([8]-[15]).

Critically there were provisions for payment.  A CRO could claim a payment for the time spent on a response or at training. The payments were not triggered by attendance, they were triggered by a CRO making a claim, and CRO’s were not required to claim the payment and some did not.  The payment was described (at [17]) as ‘remuneration for time, travel and expenses associated with specific activities undertaken whilst on authorised duty’. 

The reasons for the litigation are not important suffice to say that Mr Morgan’s status became relevant. The Employment Tribunal found that he was a volunteer, not a ‘worker’ (as defined in the Employment Rights Act 1996(UK) s 230(3)(b)).  An appeal tribunal set aside that decision and found that he was a worker.  The MCA appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the question of whether a person was a worker was determined by the facts of the relationship and not how it was described. The fact that the MCA documents continually stressed that CRO’s were volunteers, not employees was evidence of the intended relationship but did not ultimately determine the issue. 

The Court found that there was a contractual relationship between Mr Groom and MCA each time Mr Groom (or any CRO) responded to a call out. The fact that CRO’s were under no obligation to respond to any particular call out did not mean that they were not bound by the terms of the agreement between then and the MCA, set out in Handbook and the Code of Conduct when they did respond.  At [39]-[40] Bean LJ (with whom Popplewell LJ agreed) said:

The three documents on which the Claimant relies – the Volunteer Handbook, the Code of Conduct and the remuneration document – are a coherent set of documents which depict what was actually happening on the ground. In particular, what they show is that while a CRO was not obliged to attend for work on any particular occasion, and could specify the time for which he was willing to do so, if he did attend he was bound to obey reasonable instructions; and was entitled, although not compelled, to claim remuneration for much of that work… In those circumstances it seems to me quite unreal to say that there was no intention to create legal relations between the parties. As the EAT [Employment Appeal Tribunal] found, a contract comes into existence when a CRO attends for an activity in respect of which there is a right to claim remuneration.

I also reject the MCA’s argument that there is no mutuality of obligation between the Agency and a CRO who has attended for work. The basic obligations are (on the part of the CRO) to comply with reasonable instructions while on duty (and, on the part of the MCA) to make payment on receipt of a claim for attendance for relevant activities…

A true volunteer may be paid travel, and presumably other expenses, without affecting their status. The MCA’s own documentation, however, said the payment was ‘… “compensation for any disruption to your personal life and employment”. As the deputy judge said in the EAT, a payment in compensation for interference with a person’s use of their time is the essence of remuneration’ ([41]).

The fact that a person, such as a casual employee, is not bound to accept work or turn up when asked does not mean that there can be no contract between the employer and worker when the worker does elect to work ([42]-[44]).  At [45] His Honour said:

… the CRO has a great deal of freedom to accept or not accept work. and to limit the time spent on MCA activities. He can decline to accept a call-out request (although there is a contractual obligation to accept a reasonable proportion of them). He can say “I can come but I will have to leave at 4 pm to go to work, even if the missing boat has not been found”. But that does not detract from the fact that CROs are plainly “workers” within s 230(2)(b) of the 1996 Act.

The Act is the Employment Rights Act so a finding that the CRO was a ‘worker’ for that Act would trigger a finding that they are entitled to the other rights under that Act. 

Stuart-Smith LJ agreed on the outcome but delivered a separate judgment.  His Honour pointed out that the definition of ‘worker’ refereed to a person working under a ‘contract of employment’ so the critical issue was whether there was a contract between the MCA and the CROs ([49]-[51]).   At [56] he said (references omitted):

The existence within a relationship of remuneration being paid to a person who has agreed to carry out work will in most cases be a strong indication both of an intention to create legal relations and, where the remuneration is to be regarded as consideration for the carrying out of the work, for the existence of a contract. The reasons for this are obvious and include the fact that an agreement by one person that, in consideration of a wage or other remuneration by another, he will provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for that other is the classic first indication (necessary but not necessarily sufficient) of a contract of service. Conversely, the absence of payment is likely to be a striking indicator that a person is a “pure” volunteer and not a “worker”…

His Honour rejected the idea that the agreement between the MCA and CROs was not intended to create legal relations.  He said (at [57]):

I now regard the suggestion that there was no intention on the part of the parties to create legal relations as unarguable. It would entail a conclusion that if, on the CRO claiming the financial recompense outlined in the MCA’s documentation, the MCA refused to pay it, the CRO would have no legally enforceable right to claim it. That proposition seems to me to be completely unsustainable … For a start it is inconsistent with the MCA’s remuneration document, which refers to the payments as “remuneration”. Second, the fact that CROs are given the right to claim payment carries the plain implication that a CRO making a claim in accordance with the MCA’s documentation is entitled to be paid what they claim. I agree with the Vice-President in describing this arrangement as a classic “wage/work” bargain. It needs no imagination to predict what the reaction of the CROs as a body would be if the MCA were now to assert openly that the provisions as to remuneration gave the CROs no enforceable right to be paid.

The conclusion was that CROs are workers for the purposes of the Act. This has raised concerns for the MCA and the government – see 

Application to Australia

The case of course has no direct application in Australia – it is the decision of an English court determining the impact of a UK statute.  But indirectly it is relevant.  It does not raise a question that payment of expenses, eg a travel allowance and probably a meal allowance (particularly if it requires receipts and repayment of actual expenses rather than a per diem allowance) does not make a volunteer a worker or an employee. But payment of an hourly rate of pay would suggest such an arrangement.

In many jurisdictions for examples fire fighters are retained so they are paid per hour for call outs and training. Historically in NSW, for example, these firefighters were called ‘volunteers’ and what are now retained fire brigades were called volunteer fire brigades. That situation was changed in 2018 and the status of retained firefighters as employees was recognised.   For a discussion on the law in Australia see:

This English case won’t change the position in Australia but no doubt if the issue arises again a person who is entitled to claim a per hour rate for their attendance would look to this decision as a persuasive authority to support their argument that such a payment is indicative of an employment relationship with whatever extra protections that might bring.

This blog is a general discussion of legal principles only.  It is not legal advice. Do not rely on the information here to make decisions regarding your legal position or to make decisions that affect your legal rights or responsibilities. For advice on your particular circumstances always consult an admitted legal practitioner in your state or territory.