Caller v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2025] NSWDC 468 was a claim for compensation by a NSW Police officer.  Former constable Caller alleged negligence by NSW Police leading to development of significant and debilitating PTSD.  There was no single incident but the continued exposure to traumatic events that is characteristic of service with the police but also ambulance, fire and rescue services.

The facts and even the outcome of the case are not legally important (hint: the claim was unsuccessful). What will inform readers of this blog, in prose better than I can write, is Judge Newlinds opening statements on the law.  He said (at [1]-[7] and [11]; emphasis added):

In recent decades, it has become more and more apparent to the scientific and medical community that a significant proportion of people, if exposed to repeated traumatic events, will ultimately succumb to the recognised psychiatric disorder known as post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).

It follows that those most susceptible to PTSD are people who are regularly exposed to witnessing, or being involved in, traumatic events over an extended period of time. Thankfully in 21st century Australia, most of us are exposed to very few serious traumatic events throughout the course of our lives. However, those involved in front-line emergency services, including the Police Force, Ambulance, Fire Brigade, and the like are not so fortunate.

As part and parcel of their duties, these “first responders” will be exposed to serious traumatic incidents on many occasions. The very nature of their duties makes this inevitable. Their job includes to try and rescue and assist people in dire predicaments. Thus, they are inherently at risk, by virtue of their duties, of suffering PTSD, which is a recognised psychiatric injury. The wider community is now well aware of this.

As a society, it is essential that people involved in these front-line occupations exist and carry out their duty. When any one of us is in need of urgent help, we expect them to come. Yet we know it is inevitable that some of them will suffer psychiatric injury as a result. Who then ought bear the economic cost of that injury?

The law is settled; notwithstanding the likely consequences, without more, there are no common law remedies available to first responders if they succumb to PTSD just because of exposure to traumatic events. Rather, that situation is dealt with by whatever pension arrangements are put in place by the Government, the Worker’s Compensation Regime determined by Parliament, together with whatever insurance a particular officer may have in place from time to time.

There will be a claim, compensable by common law damages, available in negligence against the employer of a first responder, if it can be shown that reasonable care was not taken to protect a particular officer by failing to take reasonable steps to identify the particular officer was at risk, over and above what might be ordinarily expected. The circumstance may include knowledge that the officer is suffering, psychiatric or psychological harm, or showing signs that they are, or might, succumb to PTSD, and then failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that officer receives appropriate treatment and support to alleviate or lessen the effect of his or her injury, or potential injury.

In such a claim, legal and factual questions going to breach of duty, causation, and damages are notoriously difficult and interrelated. This case is an example of some of those complexities….

Our society needs people to be prepared to serve as front line emergency workers, notwithstanding that it is clearly understood that, in doing so, they put themselves at considerable risk of psychiatric injury. In a perfect world, every one of them that suffers such an injury would be compensated, but the world is not perfect and the law in this area is calibrated as it must be.

With respect to the duty of care that the police service, and ultimately the state owes to serving police, His Honour said (at [74]-[77]):

… Police officers commonly are exposed to danger and extremely stressful situations and individuals’ ability to cope with those situations vary widely…

What is clear is that the mere exposure of police officers to traumatic events on a repeated basis will not, on its own, amount to a breach of duty of care, notwithstanding that the risk of developing PTSD from such exposure exists and is well understood and is foreseeable. To impose such a duty would be unreasonable or unrealistic and would mean police could not perform their important role in society.

Since State of New South Wales v Briggs [2016] 95 NSWLR 467 (“Briggs”), it has been established that the content of the duty of care owed by the Police Force to a serving officer must:

  1. Accommodate the relevant statutory context including provisions of the Police Act 1990 (NSW) and the special nature of service rendered by police officers to the Crown; and
  2. Take into account some of the incidents of the usual employer – employee relationship (adjusted to take into account the fact that the relationship is between the State and a serving police officer).

Similar statements could be expected for fire and ambulance officers. Any argued duty of care has to recognise the nature of policing (or firefighting or ambulance work). The duty cannot be a duty to prevent officers being exposed to the sort of traumatic events that might lead to PTSD as that would stop the police (or fire brigades or ambulance services) being able to do their job. The nature of the job and the duties inherent in the job have to be accommodated in how the employer’s duty is described.  This has lead the courts to identify what is required.  At [78] Newlinds DCJ said:

As formulated prospectively in Sills v State of New South Wales [2019] NSWCA 4 (“Sills”) at [9] and State of New South Wales v Skinner [2022] NSWCA 9 (“Skinner on Appeal”), the duty of care in the context of this sort of case requires the Police Force to take reasonable steps to:

  1. Identify officers who, through the performance of their duties, were at particular risk of suffering or were suffering psychiatric or psychological harm;
  2. Take (reasonable) steps to ensure that any officer so identified received appropriate treatment and support to alleviate or lessen the effect of his or her injury; and
  3. Consult with appropriate persons in the workplace to identify hazards associated with the work environment and systems of work if and when the injured officer returned to duty, including the assessment of the risk of injury or further injury.

The outcome in this case

In this case the plaintiff was (at [87]):

… seeking compensation because he claims that the Defendant failed to educate him properly, failed to take reasonable steps to identify that he was a person who was exhibiting signs that he was at particular risk of suffering, or indeed was suffering, an onset of PTSD, and failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that he received appropriate treatment and support to alleviate or lessen the effect of that state of affairs.

I will not go through the evidence and findings in detail, suffice to say His Honour, although critical of some aspects of the police response to issues of PTSD, found (at [175]) ‘no breach in relation to failure to educate, [and] no breach in allowing the Plaintiff to return to work to return to general duties…’.  There was a failure to have ‘appropriate systems in place’ to observe and monitor staff and react to them if they were perceived to be at risk of PTSD or developing symptoms of the disorder.  But, (at [195]), His Honour:

Whilst satisfied that, in the limited way I have described, the Defendant breached its duty of care to the Plaintiff during the period he was a police officer, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that breach of duty, or indeed a combination of all of the alleged breaches, was a material contributor to the Plaintiff’s current significant symptoms and diminished earning capacity. In other words … I do not consider the Plaintiff’s case on causation to rise higher than a possibility of a better outcome.

That is, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish his case on the balance of probabilities or ‘more likely than not’.  His Honour found that even if the deficiencies identified in the police systems had not been there, the best that could be said is that it might have led to a better outcome not that it is more likely than not that it would have led to a better outcome. 

Discussion

It is true that the courts recognise that exposure to traumatic events and therefore the risk of psychiatric disorders such as PTSD are inherent risks in working as a police officer, firefighter or ambulance officer (and see, as a related post Negligence claims relating to PTSD (May 14, 2018)). In Australia these risks are taken by both paid and volunteer responders.

Part of the problem is that the duty on the services is to identify those at risk of, or actually developing symptoms and to take proactive action.  That may involve have options for those staff to seek assistance or their supervisors to direct them to assistance. However there may be resistance to these efforts. As was said in Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance[2007] QCA 366:

Employees may well regard such an intrusion as an invasion of privacy. Employees may rightly regard such an intrusion as a gross impertinence by a fellow employee… Employees … might rightly be deeply resentful of suggestions which reflect an adverse assessment of the employee’s ability or performance and prospects of promotion… A conclusion that an employee [sic; I think this should say ‘employer’] has acted unreasonably in failing to recommend psychological assessment and treatment cannot be made without recognising that the employer’s decision must be made in a social, economic and legal context which includes these considerations.

Some might say it is the employer that is the problem and the cause of risk, but as noted by Newlinds DCJ the duty on that employer is to monitor the staff, refer them for treatment and determine if they are fit for duty and that can at times mean that the only reasonable response is in fact to move a person out of their career.   A member who is taking reasonable care of his or her own safety is also under an obligation to take advantage of the support systems, disclose their symptoms and to make their own assessment that now might be the time to go. Service in the emergency services may not be and perhaps should not be promoted as a lifelong career for all recruits. 

Notwithstanding that members of the emergency services are ‘… inherently at risk, by virtue of their duties, of suffering PTSD, which is a recognised psychiatric injury [and] The wider community is now well aware of this…’ there appears to be no shortage of recruits lining up to join the various services (a fact for which we can all be grateful).  I do wonder how many of those recruits truly understand that, whatever motivates them to seek this line of work (whether it’s the sense of service, or adventure, or the fact that each day will be unpredictable) that this job is likely to do them harm.  The same is true for the military.   Notwithstanding the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, there are still, I infer, many young people seeking to join the ADF for a well remunerated and exciting career that is likely to lead to physical and mental injury, particularly if they are required to service in combat or combat like operations. 

Conclusion

As noted, Mr Caller was not successful in his application for common law damages. The particular facts of the matter are not important to the broader audience (though of course they are vitally important to him and we thank him for his service).

What is important is reiterating that:

  1. The courts recognise that service in the emergency services exposes the members to a heightened risk of psychiatric injury such at PTSD.
  2. The proof that PTSD was acquired in the course of one’s employment entitles the employee to workers compensation under whatever scheme is currently in operation (and see Alexander Lewis, ‘NSW government workers’ comp changes defeated as premier declares fight is ‘over’’, ABC News (Online), 14 November 2025 regarding the defeat of attempts to make it harder to claim compensation for psychiatric injury).
  3. The proof that PTSD was acquired in the course of one’s employment does not entitle the applicant to more generous common law benefits. For that there has to be proof of a breach of duty of care. The duty of the emergency services has to take into account the inherent nature of the work. That emergency service workers are repeatedly exposed to trauma is not evidence of breach of duty.  
  4. According to Newlinds DCJ the duty is a duty to:
    1. Identify officers who, through the performance of their duties, were at particular risk of suffering or were suffering psychiatric or psychological harm;
    2. Take (reasonable) steps to ensure that any officer so identified received appropriate treatment and support to alleviate or lessen the effect of his or her injury; and
    3. Consult with appropriate persons in the workplace to identify hazards associated with the work environment and systems of work if and when the injured officer returned to duty, including the assessment of the risk of injury or further injury.

This blog is a general discussion of legal principles only.  It is not legal advice. Do not rely on the information here to make decisions regarding your legal position or to make decisions that affect your legal rights or responsibilities. For advice on your particular circumstances always consult an admitted legal practitioner in your state or territory.