I received this question as a comment to my post NSW liable for excessive use of force by police acting under the Mental Health Act (November 27, 2025):

I was particularly interested in your recent post on NSW liable for excessive use of force by police acting under the Mental Health Act, and I was wondering how applicable that case might be in a Queensland context—specifically in relation to the use of an Emergency Examination Authority (EEA) in similar circumstances.

I vaguely recall you noting in a previous post that the use of an EEA has not yet been meaningfully contested through the courts in Queensland. With that in mind, I’m curious whether you think this NSW case provides a fair or useful comparison, or whether the legislative and operational differences limit its applicability.

What struck me most about the case was how weak the initial justification appeared to be for apprehending the person for mental health examination; the extent of the efforts taken by police to apprehend her; the level of force ultimately used; and, perhaps most strikingly, the seemingly limited consequences for police despite the court finding excessive force.

It left me with the impression that there is effectively no clear “lower threshold” for what level of perceived risk is considered acceptable. I was disappointed—but not entirely surprised—that the court found there was sufficient cause for entry, and that once that threshold was met, the subsequent escalation was largely treated as justified. The repercussions appear so modest that I wonder whether they meaningfully deter similar actions in future, particularly when weighed against the perceived personal or organisational risk of leaving someone at home.

From a paramedic perspective, my experience has been that when clinicians actively engage with a person experiencing a mental health crisis—taking time, respecting their wishes, and working toward an outcome aligned with their goals—the vast majority can be managed without coercion. In contrast, it is often only when a person feels their rights are being taken away, their perspective dismissed, or they are being forced into an unwanted course of action that escalation occurs. Likewise, someone who initially presents as irrational can often become rational when appropriately de-escalated, which is why de-escalation plays such a central role in managing behavioural disturbance.

What frustrated me about this case was how escalatory the response appeared to be: forced entry, detention of the son, tasering the dog, calling in riot police, and the use of capsicum spray. It seems entirely foreseeable that an ordinary person might react defensively—or appear increasingly distressed—when subjected to that level of intrusion and force.

I have attended numerous jobs that begin in very similar ways, for example

  • A bank calling after someone says, “I might as well die,” when told they cannot access superannuation early;
  • A family member calling after someone posts photos of medication on social media;
  • A person detained by police says they’ll kill themselves if they are not allowed a cigarette.

In many of these cases there is a significant “he said, she said” component. The comment may have been made in the heat of the moment, while intoxicated, or in response to a transient stressor that has since resolved. There is often no plan, no intent, and no self-harm beyond superficial injury.

When I consider the threshold for an EEA which uses the example of “a person threatening to commit suicide”—it seems to me that this encompasses an extremely broad spectrum. At the lower end might be someone who says, in an elevated state, “Oh my God, what else is going to happen? I might as well just kill myself,” later explaining it as a figure of speech, with no plan, no intent, and no acts of self-harm. At the higher end are those actively preparing for suicide, maintaining intent, or presenting with immediate, credible risk.

I would be very interested in your thoughts on whether the NSW case meaningfully informs how Queensland courts might view the use of an EEA in marginal or low-acuity scenarios, and whether you see any realistic prospect of Queensland courts drawing firmer boundaries around escalation, use of force, or proportionality in these contexts.

It’s a bit hard to give a simple answer but doing the best I can yes, I think the NSW case would be of interest if a matter arose in Queensland. Note first that this was a decision of a judge in the NSW District Court.   A court case is only a binding precedent on a lower court in the same court hierarchy. The decisions of trial judges do not, usually, create significant legal precedents (see Accessing a judge or magistrate’s reasons for decision(November 18, 2016)).  The decision of a NSW district court judge gives an interesting example, but does not create a precedent and certainly not a binding precedent in Queensland, but I’m sure in Queensland the reasoning process would be similar.

The first step would be to ask if the officers met the test for action.  The Public Health Act 2005 (Qld) s 157B says an ambulance or police officer may detain a person if the:

… ambulance officer or police officer believes—

(a) a person’s behaviour, including, for example, the way in which the person is communicating, indicates the person is at immediate risk of serious harm; and

Example—

a person is threatening to commit suicide

(b) the risk appears to be the result of a major disturbance in the person’s mental capacity, whether caused by illness, disability, injury, intoxication or another reason; and

(c) the person appears to require urgent examination, or treatment and care, for the disturbance. 

The officer has to be satisfied that all three – (a), (b) and (c) – are established (and see State of mind required for action under the Public Health Act 2005 (Qld) s 157B and EEAs (August 8, 2025)). Note that ‘a person is threatening to commit suicide’ is relevant to (a), that is whether they are risk of serious harm. It is not evidence of (b) that is that the risk is the result of a major disturbance in their capacity (see In Queensland, is threatening suicide evidence of ‘a major disturbance in [a] person’s mental capacity’? (August 6, 2020)). 

The question I think that is important both in Queensland and in NSW (and which I think was not addressed in the NSW case) is why anyone thought Ms Music or someone in a similar situation actually intended to harm themselves or why this was a the product of a disturbance in capacity or a mental illness.  Threatening to kill oneself without a cigarette would, in most cases, by hyperbole only, and saying ‘I might as well die’ if one has real fear about their prospects is hardly a threat (it’s not the same as “I’m going to kill myself”).  And in some circumstances killing oneself could be a rational response to events as one sees them, why go on living in abject poverty, or if facing many years in gaol or some other future that offends your own life goals and philosophy?

To get back to the issue however, the Queensland Act is based on the officers actual beliefs, provided he or she believes that (a), (b) and (c) are all true then he or she can take action under the Act.  What is different in the Queensland Act is the obligation upon the officer to (s 157C(1)):

(a) tell the person that the officer is detaining the person and transporting the person to a treatment or care place; and

(b) explain to the person how taking action under paragraph (a) may affect the person.

The officer (s 157C(2)):

… must take reasonable steps to ensure the person understands the information given under subsection (1), including by telling the person or explaining the thing to the person—

(a) in an appropriate way having regard to the person’s age, culture, mental impairment or illness, communication ability and any disability; and

(b) in a way, including, for example, in a language, the person is most likely to understand.

As in NSW ‘An {Queensland] ambulance officer or police officer may exercise the power to detain and transport a person under this chapter with the help, and using the force, that is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances’.  The decision in Music’s case gives an example of what was excessive force and which I’m sure would also be considered excessive in Queensland if the same circumstances were to arise there.

With respect to the comments:

…once that threshold was met, the subsequent escalation was largely treated as justified. The repercussions appear so modest that I wonder that the court found there was sufficient cause for entry, and that once that threshold was met, the subsequent escalation was largely treated as justified. The repercussions appear so modest that I wonder whether they meaningfully deter similar actions in future, particularly when weighed against the perceived personal or organisational risk of leaving someone at home.

I don’t think I agree that the subsequent escalation was largely treated as justified though I accept the critical issue in his honour’s reasoning was the use of capsicum spray. I just don’t think his honour really addressed the other issues as having found one use of unreasonable force that was sufficient for a verdict for the plaintiff.

As for the repercussions appearing to be so modest as to query ‘whether they meaningfully deter similar actions in future’ I remind readers that this was a civil case. A civil case for compensation leads to an award that is intended to put the plaintiff in the position (as far as money can) that they would have been had the wrong not occurred. It is not a punishment so the value of the damages does not depend on the scale of the wrongdoing, so having found that the use of capsicum was excessive force, his honour did not have to go through every other action to ask if that was justified.  Secondly the value of the damages reflects the plaintiff’s losses not the defendant’s abilty to pay and is not intended to act as a deterrent.  Deterrence is the role of the criminal law. Specifically in Music’s case his honour rejected the application for ‘aggravated and exemplary damages (ie increased damages to make an example of the tortfeasor or wrong-doer).’  The outcome was to compensate, Ms Music, not act as a deterrent.

Conclusion

Do I think ‘… the NSW case meaningfully informs how Queensland courts might view the use of an EEA in marginal or low-acuity scenarios?’ Yes, I think, as in NSW, a Queensland court would say that the test of action is a subjective test that is the question is does the officer believe the necessary elements for action exist, in Queensland that is that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in s 157B are all true; and then that any force used is ‘reasoanble’, ‘[a]lthough great latitude [is] to be given to officers given the need for judgment in the ‘agony of the moment’ and the depth of their own experience’. Even so ‘the objective component that is that the force used must be ‘such as a reasonable man placed as he was placed would not consider to be disproportionate to the evil to be prevented the force used’ must be considered’.  

This blog is a general discussion of legal principles only.  It is not legal advice. Do not rely on the information here to make decisions regarding your legal position or to make decisions that affect your legal rights or responsibilities. For advice on your particular circumstances always consult an admitted legal practitioner in your state or territory.