Today’s correspondent asks if I:

… can shed some light on a matter regarding PSIVOs [Personal Safety Intervention Orders] in VIC. If a CFA member obtains an interim order against another member of their brigade for alleged bullying, what is the appropriate course of action for CFA to take?

The relevant Act is the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (Vic). Under that Act a court can make a PSIVO if (s 61):

… if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that—

(a) the respondent has—

(i) committed prohibited behaviour against the affected person and—

(A) is likely to continue to do so or do so again; and

(B) the respondent’s prohibited behaviour would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety; or

(ii) stalked the affected person and is likely to continue to do so or do so again; and

(b) the respondent and the affected person are not family members; and

(c) it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case to make a final order.

Prohibited behaviour is (s 5):

(a) assault; or

(b) sexual assault; or

(c) harassment; or

(d) property damage or interference; or

(e) making a serious threat.

Bullying per se is not prohibited conduct unless the conduct said to constitute bullying falls within one of the behaviours listed. The most likely is ‘harassment’ which is defined (s 7) as ‘a course of conduct by a person towards another person that is demeaning, derogatory or intimidating …’.

An interim order, that is an order made before evidence is heard and the applicant’s case is established, can be made if (s 35):

… a person has applied to the court for a personal safety intervention order and the court is satisfied—

(a) on the balance of probabilities, that an interim order is necessary pending a final decision about the application—

(i) to ensure the safety of the affected person; or

(ii) to preserve any property of the affected person; and

(b) that it is appropriate to make the order in all the circumstances of the case.

What follows is that to make an order, whether a final order or an interim order, a court has to be satisfied that the order is appropriate to protect the safety of the person who claims to be in need of protection. In Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34, Dixon J said 

The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty; and this has led to attempts to define exactly the certainty required by the law for various purposes… Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences…

For a court to find that, on the balance of probabilities the interim order is necessary, the Magistrate must be satisfied albeit on the limited evidence that is available at an interim stage, that there is an actual need for the order recognising that the level of satisfaction required at this stage will be less than required for making a final order given that an interim order is indeed just that, interim, and whatever consequences it has will be relatively short lived if at the hearing of the matter the grounds for making a final order are not established. 

Whan making an order, either an interim or a final order, the court (s 67(1)) ‘may include in a personal safety intervention order any conditions that appear to the court necessary or desirable in the circumstances’. In particular, a PSIVO (s 67(2)):

… may include conditions—

(a) prohibiting the respondent from committing prohibited behaviour against the protected person; and

(b) prohibiting the respondent from stalking the protected person; and

(c) excluding the respondent from the protected person’s residence; and

(d) prohibiting the respondent from approaching, telephoning or otherwise contacting the protected person, unless in the company of a police officer, dispute assessment officer, mediator or a specified person; and

(e) prohibiting the respondent from being anywhere within a specified distance of the protected person or a specified place, including the place where the protected person lives; and

(f) prohibiting the respondent from causing another person to engage in conduct prohibited by the order; and

(g) revoking or suspending a weapons approval held by the respondent or a weapons exemption applying to the respondent as provided by section 69; and

(h) cancelling or suspending the respondent’s firearms authority as provided by section 69.

A person who is subject to a PSIVO and who breaches the conditions of that order commits an offence (s 100).  The maximum penalty for that offence is 2 years imprisonment of a fine not exceeding 240 penalty units.  From 1 July 2025 a penalty unit is $203.51 so the current maximum fine is 240 x $203.51 = $48,842.40.

Discussion

In the scenario under discussion, a member of the CFA is the subject of an interim PSIVO where the ‘protected person’ (ie the ‘person who is protected by a personal safety intervention order’; s 4) is also a member of the CFA.  The CFA, I suggest should be careful to manage the situation to ensure the protection of the protected person and also to ensure that they do not put the respondent (ie the person the subject of the order) in a position that puts them in breach of the order.  For example if the order requires that the respondent not be ‘within a specified distance of the protected person’ then it would be remiss of the CFA to direct both members to attend the same place at the same time for a CFA purpose eg training.

No doubt the CFA wants to protect its members from bullying and harassment, wants to ensure that there is no bullying and harassment within its brigades but also does not want to pre-judge matters.  

The CFA could restrict the respondent’s duties, or suspend the respondent if satisfied that he or she ‘may have engaged in conduct that is a ground for disciplinary action’ (Country Fire Authority Regulations 2025(Vic) r 58).  Misconduct is a ground for disciplinary action (r 55(f)) and is defined as (r 5):

(a) unacceptable or inappropriate conduct, having regard to any behavioural policies or standards developed by the Authority;

(b) conduct—

(i) that is likely to harm the reputation of the Authority; and

(ii) by a person who, at the time of engaging in the conduct, intends that the conduct would, or is reckless as to whether the conduct could, harm the reputation of the Authority;

Without going through each of those clauses in turn, conduct that amounts to bullying and harassment could constitute misconduct.  Just as a court does not have to be satisfied that all the allegations are established to make an interim order, the Chief Officer does not have to be satisfied that misconduct has occurred to suspend a person, just that it may have. 

I would suggest that the CFA may want to consider whether it is appropriate to put the respondent on restricted duties or in an extreme case, suspend them in order to both protect the protected person, and the respondent. 

Conclusion

It is not possible to say what ‘the appropriate course of action for CFA to take’ is as there may be more than one actions all of which could be considered appropriate.  The CFA has to consider its duty to support a member affected by bullying and harassment, its duty to ensure that there is no bullying and harassment, as well as its duty to support members subject to allegations which in turn depends on whether those members admit or deny the alleged behaviour and the CFAs own powers.  

In circumstances where a court has been satisfied ‘on the balance of probabilities, that an interim order is necessary’ then the CFA has significant notice of the need to:

  • safeguard the protected person; 
  • ensure that by its own conduct the CFA does not put the respondent in a position where he or she would be in breach of the order; and
  • take steps to see whether its own policies and standards have been breached and whether disciplinary action is required to maintain those standards and to meet its obligations to the protected person and the respondent.

This blog is a general discussion of legal principles only.  It is not legal advice. Do not rely on the information here to make decisions regarding your legal position or to make decisions that affect your legal rights or responsibilities. For advice on your particular circumstances always consult an admitted legal practitioner in your state or territory.